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10 Estimating Wage-Fringe 
Trade-Off s: 
Some Data Problems 
Robert S. Smith and Ronald G. Ehrenberg 
Fringe benefits are a growing component of total compensation, and their 
growth presents a number of challenges to economists on both the 
scientific and policymaking level. For example, when the government 
passes legislation requiring that pensions be made more generous or 
more widely available, it is natural to ask just who will pay the cost. 
Economic theory, as we will show, is quite clear on this point. It suggests 
that when pensions increase wages will decrease, other things equal, thus 
implying that it is workers themselves who will pay the cost of pension 
reform legislation. The view that wages and pensions are negatively 
related (if other things are held constant) is not widely held among 
noneconomists, however. Casual observation, in fact, yields quite the 
opposite view. TJieJiiglie_stjj^ge_wo^ 
high-wage firms are thevej^nejs-witli the^  motgl^ ejiQmjas j^ej^ jj^ ag. Even 
sophisticatecTstudies~that attempt to control for the "other things" in-
fluencing total compensation sometimes estimate that wages and pen-
sions are positively related (Blinder, Gordon, and Wise 1979). 
To take another example, federal/private sector wage comparability 
studies have historically ignored fringe benefits. If increases in earnings 
and increases in fringe benefits are roughly proportional within each 
sector, then changes in earnings may serve as an adequate index (given 
the cost of acquiring fringe benefit data) for changes in total compensa-
tion. However, if, as economists suspect, earnings and fringe benefits are 
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inversely related within each sector, other things equal, then comparabil-
ity studies that ignore fringes could be seriously deficient. 
Finally, many labor market studies that should be measuring and 
analyzing total compensation focus instead on wages or earnings owing to 
the general paucity of fringe benefit data. If marginal changes in wages 
and fringe benefits are proportionally related, other things equal, these 
studies may not contain fatal biases; however, if such changes can be 
shown to be inversely related, then problems of unknown magnitude 
could arise in such important areas as judging sectors with labor surpluses 
and shortages, assessing the existence and size of compensating wage 
differentials, measuring the returns to human capital investments, and 
measuring the "unexplained residual" for minorities and women. 
Common to the above examples is the problem of estimating the 
trade-off between wages and fringe benefits. While estimating this trade-
off might appear on the surface to be a straightforward matter of obtain-
ing data on fringe benefits, we will show in this paper that it is not. 
Instead, there are potentially serious biases that arise when standard data 
sets are used. Thus, if we are to successfully shed light on the important 
issues of wage-fringe trade-offs, some rather unique data requirements 
must be met. 
This paper represents an inquiry into some of the data related difficul-
ties inherent in estimating wage-fringe trade-offs, and it explores the 
usefulness of a particular source of data in meeting these difficulties. 
In section 10.1 we briefly present the theory underlying economists' 
notions about the trade-offs between wages and fringe benefits. Section 
10.2 discusses the unique data required to test this theory, and section 
10.3 describes a test using such data. In section 10.4 tests for wage-fringe 
trade-offs using conventional data are described and analyzed for the 
purpose of assessing the extent of any biases that arise when such data are 
used. The paper concludes with a section on data recommendations. 
10.1 The Theory of the Wage-Fringe Relationship 
Economic theory of the relationship between wages and fringe benefits 
in competitive markets starts with the notion that it is total compensation 
that matters to employers. They are trying to maximize profits and, in so 
doing, will endeavor to assemble a labor force of sufficient quality and 
size to enable them to produce output that they can sell at competitive 
prices. To attract the desired quantity and quality of labor requires that 
they offer a compensation bundle the total value of which is at least as 
good as other employers are offering. However, if they offer total com-
pensation that is too high, they will find their costs are such that they 
cannot compete in the product market. The result of these forces is that 
they will offer total compensation that is no more or less than is offered by 
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other employers to workers in the same labor market. In short, for every 
type of worker or skill grade, there will be a "going rate" of total 
compensation that firms must pay. 
Employees, on the supply side of the market, will of course want to 
obtain offers that are as large as possible. They will find, however, that 
firms are unwilling to offer compensation packages that are more in total 
value than the going rate. Their problem, then, is to choose the package 
whose composition best suits their tastes. 
The employer and employee sides of the market, discussed above, are 
summarized graphically in figure 10.1, using pensions as an example of a 
Fig. 10.1 
Yearly Increment in Present Value 
of Promised Pension Benefits 
The trade-off between wages and promised pension benefits. 
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fringe benefit. This graph depicts the relationship between pensions and 
wages, and it implicitly assumes all other job characteristics and elements 
of compensation are already determined. We have argued that employers 
must pay the "going rate" in terms of total compensation, and that at this 
compensation level they will be competitive in both the labor and product 
markets. The employer side of the labor market can thus be represented 
by an "isoprofit curve"—a curve along which any combination of wages 
and pensions yields equal profits to the firm. The isoprofit curve shown, 
XX, is the zero-profit (competitive) curve, and it implies that the firm 
must pay $X'm total compensation to be competitive in the labor market. 
If we ignore, for the moment, the effects of pensions on absenteeism, 
turnover, and work effort, the firm's total costs will be the same whether 
the firm spends %X on wages or %X on pensions; hence, the isoprofit 
"curve" shown is a straight line with a slope of (minus) unity. If all firms in 
the labor market depicted by figure 10.1 have isoprofit curves with a 
unitary slope, the "offer curve" facing employees in that market will be a 
straight line (XX) with the same unitary slope. 
While the assumption underlying figure 10.1 is one of a linear offer 
curve with a slope of unity, the locus of offers could trace out either a 
straight line or a curve that has a slope, the absolute value of which is 
greater (or less) than unity, depending upon whether the presence of 
pensions reduces (or enhances) worker productivity. Specifically, sup-
pose pension plans that do not offer immediate vesting reduce employee 
turnover and increase employee work effort (Lazear 1979, 1981). Some 
firms might thus find that the marginal dollar spent on increasing pension 
benefits would entail a net cost of less than a dollar; this phenomenon 
would tend to flatten the isoprofit curves drawn in wage-pension space. 
On the other hand, if pension benefits (or other fringe benefits) are 
essentially independent of hours currently worked per year, firms with 
relatively generous pension plans and correspondingly lower wages may 
find that they experience greater absenteeism than they otherwise would 
(Allen 1981). Thus, one could also argue that isoprofit curves can have a 
slope greater than unity in absolute value. 
If the cost-reducing effects of pensions always dominate the cost-
increasing effects, but the marginal effect of an additional dollar of 
pension benefits on costs diminishes with the level of pension benefits, 
then the isoprofit curve, and hence market offer curve, will have a 
concave shape as shown in figure 10.2 (the curve yy). In contrast, if firms 
with isoprofit curves whose slope is always greater than unity coexist in 
the market with those whose isoprofit curves have a less than unitary 
slope, the locus of offers to employees could fall along a convex curve— 
QRST as shown in figure 10.3. 
The above arguments concerning the offer curve, which are derived 
from an analysis of the employer side of the market, suggest that the 
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Yearly Increment in Present Value 
of Promised Pension Benefits 
Fig. 10.2 A concave offer curve resulting from diminishing marginal 
effects of pensions on costs. 
problem facing employees is one of choosing the compensation package 
that maximizes utility. That is, the observed compensation packages in a 
given labor market will trace out the offer curve that exists at any point in 
time, and the package chosen by any employee will reflect his or her 
utility function. The exact shapes of employee indifference curves in 
wage-pension space are not critical to our analysis, although linear or 
concave indifference curves would in general lead to corner solutions (in 
which case a variety of wage/pension "mixes" would not be observed in a 
given market). We have thus drawn the indifference curves in figures 
10.1,10.2, and 10.3 as convex. Are there other reasons to suppose these 
indifference curves are convex? 
In the life cycle context, workers could be viewed as maximizing a 
lifetime stream of utility; thus, different wage-pension combinations 
could simply be viewed as different asset portfolios. However, given 
one's tastes, the marginal rate of substitution between wage goods and 
pensions is likely to be diminishing. As wages are increased and pensions 
are reduced, more of one's total compensation becomes taxable (at 
\ 
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Yearly Increment in Present Value 
of Promised Pension Benefits 
Fig. 10.3 A convex offer curve: XX, pensions do not change produc-
tivity; 77", pensions increase productivity; QQ', pensions re-
duce productivity. 
progressively increasing rates) at the relatively high tax rates that prevail 
during one's working years. These relatively high and increasing rates 
tend to progressively increase the amount of pretax wages employees 
would require to compensate them for successive reductions in pension 
benefits. Conversely, as wages are reduced and pension benefits are 
increased, less of one's total compensation becomes accessible for current 
expenditure—a fact suggesting that workers will be willing to accept 
ever-smaller wage reductions in return for progressive increases in pen-
sion benefits.1 Thus convex indifference curves in wage-pension space 
seem likely to exist. 
Figures 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3, and the associated theory behind them 
suggest three things about the relationship between wages and pensions. 
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First, they suggest that employees pay for their own pensions through a 
lowered wage. That is, there should be a negative wage-pension rela-
tionship once other things that affect compensation have been controlled 
for (as they have by assumption in all figures). Second, theory also 
suggests that the above negative trade-off might be close to (or fluctuate 
around) unity. Third, the observed trade-off could be linear, convex, or 
concave. 
Similar reasoning about how labor markets work leads us, more gener-
ally, to expect that the trade-off between wages and any fringe benefit, 
ceteris paribus, will be negative. Moreover, when such benefits are 
expressed in terms of employer cost, the trade-off we can observe should 
be close to unitary. Thus, companies with a more generous fringe benefit 
package will tend to pay lower wages, other things equal. 
The theoretical considerations noted here suggest the outlines of an 
empirical study wherein the determinants of wages could be estimated by 
an equation such as 
(1) W=-a0 + a1 P + afF+axX+e, 
where W is the wage or salary paid to workers, P is the present value of 
yearly per worker pension accruals ("normal cost"),2 Fis the employer 
cost of other fringe benefits per worker, X is a vector of all other factors 
that influence wages or salaries, and e is a random error term. The 
coefficients a, are to be estimated, and it is predicted that ax and af will be 
negative and close to unitary in absolute value.3 
10.2 Data Requirements 
While equation (1) appears to offer a rather simple empirical test, to 
estimate it requires data that do not normally exist in standard household 
or firm surveys. In particular, equation (1) imposes three data require-
ments that are difficult to meet. Eirst, the variables P and F require the 
a^ilab^yjjfjajfaon employers' costs of fringe benefits,. That is, we need 
to havfejacce^sjojestimatesof "normal pension cost and the cost of other 
fringe benefits^which in many cases requires actuarial estimates that 
take jnto_ account employee turnover^ and other factors affecting the 
probability that they will b^_eligible for, or chopse„tojejgeiye, a given 
benefit—These dataxan only be found in employer-based data sets—and 
eyenjhere only rareW. — — — 
Second, many'fringe benefits are explicitly stated as a function of 
wages, so that detailed information on the determinants of their actuarial 
value are required to estimate equation (1) in an unbiased way. W and P 
in equation (1), for example, are closely related for more than the 
behavioral reason suggested by theory. They are related in a very techni-
cal sense, because pension benefits are normally calculated as some 
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fraction of wages. We are interested in the behavioral relationship, not 
the technical one, but the latter relationship (which is a positive one) may 
obscure the former (which we hypothesize to be negative). We must 
therefore find a way to filter out the technical from the behavioral 
relationship. 
One very simple filtering process consists of specifying that P (normal 
cost) is a linear function of W and a vector (Z) of all pension characteris-
tics (vesting, replacement rates, COLA adjustments, etc.): 
(2) P = bQ + b1W + bzZ + u. 
One could then proceed to estimate equations (1) and (2) using a two-
stage least-squares estimator. What this essentially involves is regressing 
P on all independent variables in (1) and (2) except W. Using these 
regression estimates, an instrument for P (call it P) is calculated and 
entered as an independent variable in equation (1), replacing P.* The 
variable P is an estimate of normal cost that is "purged" of the effects of 
wages. Using P in equation (1) thus would allow us to observe the 
behavioral relationship. 
Variables that belong in vector Z are thus necessary to an unbiased 
estimate of equation (1). Like actuarial estimates of the cost of fringe 
benefits, these variables are not commonly found in data sets; however, 
when they can be had, they are found only in employer data sets. 
The third need is for measures of the variables in vector X—the "other 
things" that influence wages. Economists normally use data on educa-
tion, age, race, sex, marital status, and so forth, to control for these 
things, but such variables are not usually found in employer data sets. 
Thus, we must either find ways to match employer and household data 
sets or take pains to address some rather severe problems inherent in 
employer data. 
In particular, it is likely that a firm—through its use of hiring standards 
and a particular compensation package—will assemble a fairly ho-
mogeneous work force. However, its work force will tend to systematical-
ly vary from the work force in other firms in characteristics that are very 
difficult to measure: motivation, dependability, competence, and aggres-
siveness. In using employer based data, the problem created by firms' 
employment of homogeneous workers who differ in unmeasurable ways 
from those employed by other firms is the classic one of "omitted vari-
ables bias." Firms that offer higher total compensation will in general be 
able to select employees with higher motivation, dependability, etc. 
High-ability workers thus receive higher wages and higher fringe ben-
efits, so that unless data on ability are available, the fringe benefit 
variables in equation (1) will pick up the effects of ability. A positive bias 
on the coefficients of the fringe benefit variables is thus distinctly possible 
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when one is using a data set in which worker quality is unobservable and 
potentially varies across firms. 
Previous studies we have done on the wage-pension trade-off in the 
public sector do not appear to have suffered much from the above 
problem of omitted variables bias (Ehrenberg and Smith 1981). The local 
government employers in those data sets were hiring workers—police, 
firefighters, and nonuniformed employees—who all worked in the same 
"industry" and had very similar duties across cities; thus, it is unlikely 
that employee quality varied substantially across cities. However, when 
one moves to tests for wage-fringe trade-offs in the private sector, 
homogeneity of worker quality across employers is much less likely. The 
managers of a company producing sophisticated technical equipment are 
likely to have different characteristics from those in a trucking firm, and 
those in highly competitive industries are likely to differ from those in a 
public utility. One purpose of this paper is to inquire into the significance 
of, and a solution to, this problem of unmeasured heterogeneity of 
workers across firms. 
10.3 Estimating Wage-Fringe Trade-Offs 
We were able to obtain an employer based data set that generally met 
the requirements outlined in the previous section. These data were 
provided to us by Hay Associates, a large compensation consulting firm. 
Hay conducts its own survey of cash and noncash compensation within 
client firms and was able to provide us with a sample of roughly two 
hundred usable observations. The sample has several rather unique 
characteristics. 
10.3.1 Controls for Other Influences on Wages 
First, salary and fringe benefit data were provided to us for three 
different white-collar job grades within each company. Hay evaluates 
every job within a client company using three principal criteria: required 
"know-how," accountability, and the degree of problem solving in-
volved. It assigns point values to each job characteristic, totals them, and 
uses these "Hay Point" evaluations as points of reference when compar-
ing compensation within and across firms. 
We were interested in obtaining the compensation associated with 
given Hay Point levels as one means of controlling for the "other things" 
that influence wages. Thus, we asked Hay to provide us with data at three 
different Hay Point levels in each of the firms: 100 Hay Points (entry level 
white-collar job for someone with a Bachelor's degree), 200 Hay Points 
(supervision of a small staff section), and 400 Hay Points (lower middle 
management position or a department head in a small organization). It 
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normally takes three to six years to go from a 100 to a 200 Hay Point job, 
and seven to fifteen years to go from a 100 to a 400 point position within 
an organization. 
Another crucial advantage to obtaining data on different job grades 
within each company is that it permits one to employ a procedure that, in 
effect, controls for the firm-specific effects of unmeasured worker charac-
teristics. For example, suppose that salaries at the 100 Hay Point level are 
given by the following variant of equation (1): 
(3) W100 = a0 + axPlO0 + afF100 + axX +amM + e, 
where M stands for the unmeasured worker characteristics, and X con-
tains other measurable variables that influence wages. Suppose also that a 
similar equation describes wages at, say 400 Hay Points: 
(4) W4oo = 06 + «i ^400 + tf/^400 + axX+amM + e'. 
The assumptions underlying equations (3) and (4) are that the wage-
fringe trade-offs (^ and af) are the same at each Hay Point level, but that 
the intercept terms (a0 and a'Q) differ. We also assume that the coefficients 
on the variables in the X vector differ, but that the X variables (firm size 
and industry, for example) are the same at each Hay Point level within a 
firm. Finally we assume that the unobservable worker characteristics (M) 
are constant within a firm and that their marginal effects (am) are the 
same in each equation (in effect, they add a constant absolute amount to 
compensation at each job level within a given firm). 
Subtracting equation (3) and (4), we arrive at an equation that explains 
the difference in salaries across Hay Point levels within each firm: 
(5) WW - W10o = (ao - «o) + «i (Aoo - Aoo) 
• +af(F400-F100) + (a'x-ax)X+e". 
One can note from equation (5) that the unobservable effects of worker 
quality drop out of the equation (we are explaining within-firm wage 
profiles now). Thus, having access to compensation data at different job 
grades within firms should allow us to work around at least some of the 
problems of omitted variables bias. 
10.3.2 Employer Cost Data on Fringe Benefits 
The second unique feature of our data set is that it contains actuarial 
estimates of employers' costs of all privately provided fringe benefits— 
pensions, paid vacations and holidays, medical-dental plans, death and 
disability benefits, and capital accumulation plans (profit sharing or stock 
options). The means of each element in total compensation (excluding 
government mandated items) are displayed for each Hay Point level in 
table 10.1. In the case of pensions, death and disability benefits, and 
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Table 10.1 Means of Hay Compensation Data Per Year 
Hay Point Level 
100 200 400 
Salary 
Pension value 
Value of vacations and holidays 
Death benefit value 
Disability benefit value 
Capital accumulation value 
Medical-dental plan value 
(same for all H.P. levels) 
$13,434 
816 
1,334 
234 
447 
385 
1,114 
$20,646 
1,450 
2,057 
346 
694 
600 
1,114 
$34,862 
2,870 
3,490 
595 
1,221 
1,034 
1,114 
NOTE: The range (standard deviation) of the salary data are as follows: 
100 H.P.: 8,200-26,100 (2,407) 
200 H.P.: 13,700-31,000 (2,972) 
400 H.P.: 24,700-50,700 (4,749) 
capital accumulation plans, values shown indicate the present value of the 
estimated increase in firm liabilities accruing during a year. 
10.3.3 Data on Pension Characteristics 
A third feature of our data set is that it contains information on several 
important pension characteristics: the effects of social security benefits on 
the pension benefits promised by the firm, eligibility and vesting provi-
sions, replacement rates, cost-of-living adjustments to benefits, death 
benefits, and retirement age. The means of several of these pension 
characteristics are summarized in table 10.2. These data permit us to 
estimate wage equations using the instrumental variables procedure out-
lined in section 10.2—the purpose of which is to purge the wage equation 
of the technical dependence of pension costs on wages. 
Unfortunately, the actuarial calculations of capital accumulation and 
death/disability benefit values were highly complex and we were not 
provided with sufficient data to meaningfully purge them of their techni-
cal dependence on wages. Our solution to this problem was to assume a 
Table 10.2 Summary Statistics on Selected Pension Plan Characteristics 
Percent of plans with full vesting after 10 years 72% 
Percent integrated with social security 87% 
Percent with formal or informal COLA 45% 
Mean replacement rate for 30-year employee 
with a salary base of $25,000 56% 
Mean replacement rate for 30-year employee 
with a salary base of $50,000 47% 
Percent with disability retirement 32% 
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one-for-one trade-off between them and wages and move the values of 
these three fringe benefits from the F vectors to the left-hand side of 
equation (5)—adding them to salaries (W100 and W400) to form W{OQ and 
W^oo, respectively. 
10.3.4 The Estimating Equations 
The wage equations we ultimately estimated had the form 
(6) A W = 4 + ax (AP) + a3AF+ a4(S) + a5(T) + adD + e", 
where AW is the change in salaries plus death, disability, and capital 
accumulation fringe benefits from one Hay Point level to another within a 
firm; AP is the change in pension value from one Hay Point level to 
another (an instrumental variable, AP, was substituted for AP as noted 
above); APis the change in days of paid leave from one Hay Point level to 
another (the value of medical-dental plans dropped out of the vector F 
because it was constant across Hay Point levels within a firm); and the 
observed firm characteristics variables are firm size (5), a dichotomous 
variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has a mandatory retirement 
policy and 0 if it does not (T), and vector of industry dummy variables 
(£>). The mandatory retirement variable, (T), is included because firms 
with mandatory retirement may well have steeper earnings profiles than 
those that do not (Lazear 1979). The average company size in this sample 
was 12,360 employees, and 50% were in manufacturing industries. No 
firm in the sample required pension contributions of its employees. 
Equation (6) was estimated using the two-stage least-squares proce-
dure outlined in section 10.2. To simultaneously estimate the "normal 
cost" function approximated by equation (2) in the context of explaining 
salary differentials across job grades within firms, we had to reformulate 
the equation as follows:5 
(7) AP = b0 + bx AW + bz Z + u. 
The variables in Z include the replacement rate (assuming workers retire 
at age 65 with thirty years of service), whether or not employees are 
immediately members of the pension plan, whether or not the plan fully 
vests after ten years of service, whether or not benefits are adjusted to 
reflect cost-of-living increases, whether or not disability retirement provi-
sions are present, the degree to which retirement benefits are offset by 
social security benefits, and whether or not an assumption of future salary 
increases was made in the actuarial calculation of normal pension cost. 
Three versions of equation (6) were estimated: differences between 
200 and 100 Hay Points, differences between 400 and 200 Hay Points, and 
differences between 400 and 100 Hay Points. The results are presented in 
table 10.3. (Results of the first-stage estimation are presented in table 
10.A. 1 in the appendix.) 
Table 10.3 Estimates of Equation (6) Determinants of the Change in Salary Plus Selected Fringe Benefits across Hay Point Levels 
within Firms (method: two-stage least squares) 
Coefficients (standard errors) of Independent Variables 
400-100 H.P. 200-100 H.P. 400-200 H.P. 
Change in paid holidays (days) 
Change in pension value (dollars) 
Presence of mandatory retirement 
Firm size (number of employees) 
Industrywide effects (financial, 
insurance, real estate omitted): 
Durable mfg. 
Nondurable mfg. 
Transportation, communications, 
and public utility 
Service 
Firms with missing data on firm size 
Constant 
R2 
Number of observations 
109.49(186.81) 
-.106(.466) 
187.46(586.65) 
.021(.009) 
643.32(757.78) 
3,229.67(803.63) 
1,036.58(1,015.00) 
-415.23(1,143.15) 
1,216.80(791.45) 
22,019.01(1,097.47) 
.14 
193 
-220.32(176.16) 
- .445(.642) 
41.07(239.26) 
.009(.004) 
79.47(309.64) 
957.80(327.40) 
802.47(413.89) 
-227.06(464.46) 
565.70(320.08) 
7,546.97(447.87) 
.13 
193 
80.88(149.85) 
.085(.472) 
-229.04(421.04) 
.012(.006) 
513.50(546.93) 
2,210.88(581.30) 
354.80(732.21) 
-220.83(824.07) 
620.65(568.46) 
14,468.68(784.09) 
.12 
193 
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The results of most interest for our current purposes, of course, are the 
estimated coefficients on the pension and paid leave variables. Theory led 
us to expect that the coefficient on the pension variable should be roughly 
- 1 in magnitude, and that the coefficient on the paid leave variable 
should be approximately equal to the negative of the change in the daily 
wage from one Hay Point level to another (which was about $30 for 100 to 
200 Hay Points, $57 for 200 to 400 Hay Points, and $87 for 100 to 400 Hay 
Points). Of the six estimated coefficients, only three have the expected 
negative sign. While none is significantly different from its expected 
magnitude, the estimates are so imprecise that none is significantly dif-
ferent from zero either. Thus, the results of this test give no support for 
our theory of the wage-fringe relationship. 
Two possible explanations for these disappointing results must be 
considered. First, it is possible, as noted earlier, that our procedure for 
finding an instrument for AP in equation (6) is too crude, so that the 
relationship between AP and AP is not very close. This seems unlikely, 
however, because, as can be seen from table 10. A. 1 in the appendix, the 
variables in the first stage of our estimating procedure explain 55-60% of 
the variance in AP. 
Second, our assumption that unmeasured employee characteristics add 
a constant dollar amount to total compensation at each Hay Point level 
may be incorrect. A tractable alternative assumption is that these un-
observed characteristics affect total compensation equiproportionally at 
each Hay Point level.6 Suppose, for example, that total compensation at 
any Hay Point level can be expressed as 
(8) W(l +p+f)=Ae(ao+axX+*M+uy, 
where p and / are employers' costs of pensions and other fringe benefits 
expressed as a fraction of wages, and cj> is the fraction by which marginal 
changes in unmeasured employee characteristics increase total com-
pensation. Taking logs and using the fact that ln(l + r)~r, when r is 
small, equation (8) can be approximated by 
(9) \nW = ao + axX+<bM + a1p + aff+u, 
where ax and af are predicted to be negative and equal to unity in absolute 
value. 
The effects of unmeasured employee characteristics, 4>M, can be elim-
inated by differencing equation (9) across Hay Point levels within a firm 
to obtain 
(10) A(lnW) = a£ + ax (Ap) + af (A/) + axX + u", 
where A indicates the change in the relevant variables across Hay Point 
levels. Because Ap will in general depend on changes in salaries across 
Hay Point levels, equation (10) was estimated using the instrumental 
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variables approach analogous to that explained earlier.7 The results of 
major interest are shown in table 10.4. 
As with the results presented in table 10.3, those in table 10.4 offer no 
support for the theory outlined in section 10.1. We will return to a brief 
discussion of these negative findings in section 10.5. However, before 
doing so, it will be instructive to consider the biases that could exist if 
alternative procedures or data were used. 
10.4 The Potential Biases Using Standard Data Sets 
Sections 10.2 and 10.3 emphasized two potential biases in estimating 
wage-fringe trade-offs using conventional data sets. First, unless account 
is taken of the technical dependence of many fringe benefits on wages, the 
behavioral trade-off will be obscured. We dealt with this potential bias by 
using an instrumental variables approach. Second, it is possible that 
workers in roughly the same jobs will differ widely in certain unmeasur-
able characteristics across firms; that is, workers within firms may be 
fairly homogeneous, while across firms they may not be. The procedure 
we adopted in section 10.3 to deal with this problem was to purge the 
estimating equations of firm-specific "fixed effects" of these unmeasured 
characteristics by analyzing within-firm salary changes. In this section we 
analyze these two potential biases by investigating what happens when 
the above problems cannot be circumvented owing to lack of data. 
10.4.1 Ordinary Least-Squares Estimates of Equations (6) and (10) 
Suppose that we had data on employers' "normal cost" of pensions, 
but that we did not have information on the characteristics of the pension 
plan. This lack of data would preclude our use of the instrumental 
variables approach described in section 10.3, and we might be forced to 
use an ordinary least-squares estimating procedure. What would be the 
consequences of this defect in our data set? 
The ordinary least-squares estimates of the coefficients of major in-
terest in equations (6) and (10) are given in table 10.5. These estimates 
demonstrate very clearly the strong positive bias that emerges when one 
is unable to control for the technical dependence of pensions on wages. 
Table 10.4 Estimated Wage-Fringe Trade-Offs, Equation (10) 
Estimated Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Equation Pensions (ar) Paid Holidays (af) 
400-100 H.P. .359(.687) -.362(1.555) 
200-100 H.P. .136(1.049) 1.615(2.553) 
400-200 H.P. .373(.682) -.175(.958) 
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Table 10.5 Estimates of the Wage-Fringe Trade-Off Using Ordinary Least 
Squares to Estimate Equations (6) and (10) 
Estimated Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Pension (a^ Paid Holidays (a/) 
Equation (6): 
Equation (10): 
400-100 H.P. 
200-100 H.P. 
400-200 H.P. 
400-100 H.P. 
200-100 H.P. 
400-200 H.P. 
1.513 (.323) 
2.391 (.379) 
1.609 (.324) 
1.247 (.501) 
2.268 (.714) 
.926 (.451) 
60.809 (174.922) 
-318.369 (153.482) 
40.730 (141.333) 
-.585 (1.538) 
-.185 (2.415) 
-.259 ( .951) 
Estimated coefficients on the pension variables, which were close to zero 
and smaller than their standard errors in tables 10.3 and 10.4, are all 
strongly positive here. Thus, data sets that do not permit the researcher 
to disentangle the technical from the behavioral relationship between 
wages and pension costs will yield biased estimates of the trade-off. 
10.4.2 Estimates Ignoring Firm-Specific Fixed Effects 
Suppose now that we had access to data on employers' fringe benefit 
costs and pension plan characteristics, but that we had only one observa-
tion per firm. Lacking the data required to filter out the "fixed effects" of 
unmeasured worker quality within a firm, one would have to attempt to 
estimate trade-offs across firms at a fixed skill level. Estimates of equa-
tions like (3), (4), and (9) at each of the three Hay Point levels, using our 
instrumental variables approach described earlier, but of course omitting 
the variable M, were made in the course of our research. The results of 
major interest are reported in table 10.6. 
In equations using the levels of salaries and fringe benefits, one can see 
(by comparing tables 10.3 and 10.6) that ignoring the fixed effects of 
Table 10.6 Estimates of the Wage-Fringe Trade-Off Ignoring the "Fixed 
Effects" of Unmeasured Worker Quality 
Estimated Coefficient (standard error) 
Paid Holidays {af) 
140.291 ( 75.550) 
330.955 (102.806) 
529.145 (146.000) 
2.445 (1.386) 
2.284 (1.227) 
' 2.403 (1.034) 
Dependent Variable 
Salary level at 100 H.P. 
200 H.P. 
400 H.P. 
Log of salary at 100 H.P. 
200 H.P. 
400 H.P. 
Pensions (ax) 
-.006 (.686) 
-.059 (.512) 
-.126 (.480) 
.506 (.590) 
-.187 (.509) 
-.635 (.451) 
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unmeasured worker characteristics does not alter the size or quality of the 
estimated wage-pension trade-off. However, ignoring these effects im-
parts a very definite positive bias to the trade-off between wages and paid 
holidays. Further, the fact that the estimated coefficient grows more 
positive as one moves up the Hay Point scale tends to suggest the effects 
of unmeasured characteristics may also tend to grow absolutely larger as 
workers are promoted. Generally, similar observations can be made by 
comparing the results of our logarithmic specification in table 10.4 with 
the corresponding results in table 10.6. Thus, there is clear evidence that 
omitted variables bias associated with unobserved worker characteristics 
is a problem that must be addressed when generating a data set for the 
purpose of estimating wage-fringe trade-offs. 
10.5 Data Recommendations 
This paper has attempted to identify the data needed to estimate 
trade-offs between wages and fringe benefits, and it has sought to explore 
the usefulness of one particular data set in this context. We have stressed 
that meaningful estimates of these trade-offs require data possessing 
three somewhat unique characteristics. First, estimates of the magnitude 
of any trade-offs require employer cost data—which, for many fringe 
benefits, entail actuarial estimation. Thus, researchers must have access 
to employer based data of a detailed nature. 
Second, because pensions and many other fringe benefits are actuarial 
functions of wages or salaries, this technical relationship must be 
accounted for when estimating the behavioral relationship of interest. 
The data required to do this properly are those other variables also 
affecting the actuarial value of fringe benefits. In the case of pensions, 
data on replacement rates, vesting, COLA adjustments, the existence of 
death or disability benefits, and the like are required. We have demon-
strated that ignoring this issue can result in seriously biased estimates. 
Finally, heterogeneity of employees across employers presents re-
searchers using employer based data with potentially severe problems of 
omitted variables bias. Unmeasured within-firm worker characteristics 
will tend to affect wages and fringes in the same direction, thus imparting 
a positive bias to the estimated coefficients on fringe benefits. We at-
tempted to circumvent this by obtaining multiple observations per firm 
and analyzing within-firm compensation changes. While these proce-
dures eliminated the countertheoretical estimates of a strong positive 
trade-off between wages and paid holidays, they did not allow us to find 
the predicted trade-off between wages and fringe benefits. In point of 
fact, we found no evidence in our data set to support the predictions of 
theory. 
Explaining our negative findings cannot be done with certainty at this 
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point. It may be that the theory is wrong, or at least not predictive of "real 
world" behavior. Given our earlier findings for the public sector, we are 
reluctant to embrace this explanation—at least until the weight of replica-
tive findings mounts up. It may also be that our theory is correct, but that 
it is difficult to isolate the wage-fringe trade-off in the private sector; 
other nonpecuniary job characteristics (e.g., working conditions) may 
vary systematically. 
A third possible explanation is that in our data set, skill level and fringe 
benefits were measured with so much error that estimates of existing 
negative trade-offs were biased toward zero. This possibility receives 
support from some of the errors we encountered in using the data and 
from the wide, overlapping ranges of salary levels at each of the three 
Hay Point levels (see the note to table 10.1). It may be that the Hay 
system of job rating is so arbitrary that across-firm comparisons are 
rendered essentially meaningless—and that the actuarial estimates of 
fringe benefit costs are so crude as to be unreliable. However, the Hay 
Point system of job evaluation is perhaps the foremost rating system of its 
kind in the world, the company is large and employs a battery of actuaries 
and other specialists, and the data we used were derived from a routine 
survey used and paid for by its clientele. It is hard to reconcile the 
hypothesis of sloppy or meaningless comparisons with the reputation and 
continued prosperity of the Hay company. If their work is of poor quality, 
would not they be punished by the market? 
While we cannot answer the preceding question, there remains a fourth 
possible explanation. Perhaps the lack of data on employee characteris-
tics caused the poor results. It could be that, despite our best efforts, we 
were really not able to completely avoid the positive biases associated 
with the problem of unmeasured worker characteristics. If this explana-
tion is correct, it would suggest that some means must be found to include 
employee characteristics into employer based data sets. It suggests, in 
other words, that unless the employer based data that researchers must 
use contain information on the education, experience, training, etc., of 
employees, unbiased estimates of wage-fringe trade-offs may not be 
possible. We recommend, then, that to the three data requirements 
discussed at length in this paper, a fourth be added. Namely, employer 
based data sets should either include measures of average employee 
characteristics directly, or they should contain sufficient identification so 
that they can be cross-referenced to employee based data sets. 
Appendix 
Table 10. A. 1 Estimated Coefficients Produced by Regressing AP on All Exogenous Variables in Equations (6) and (7) 
Variable 
Estimated Coefficients (standard errors) 
400-100 H.P. 200-100 H.P. 400-200 H.P. 
Paid holidays 
Firm size -f- 1000 
Firm size missing (0, 1) 
Durable mfg. (0, 1) 
Nondurable mfg. (0, 1) 
Trans., public utility (0, 1) 
Service industry (0, 1) 
Mandatory retirement (0, 1) 
Pension replacement rate 
Immediate membership in plan (0, 1) 
Full vesting at ten years (0, 1) 
COLA provided to benefits (0, 1) 
Disability retirement allowed (0, 1) 
Social security offset, flat % 
Social security offset, yearly level 
Social security offset capped by max. 
Social security offset by step rate (0, 1) 
Actuarial assumption of rising salaries (0,1) 
Intercept 
R2 
26.65(28.06) 
.02(1.33) 
210.89(122.12) 
-25.84(122.62) 
147.69(128.57) 
-39.38(161.87) 
221.33(173.21) 
82.83(85.94) 
,21(.03) 
157.32(90.80) 
-85.73(101.23) 
467.12(92.12) 
67.18(93.36) 
.56(.53) 
14.61(17.02) 
3.86(4.59) 
187.97(144.84) 
12.38(94.63) 
218.19(163.65) 
.60 
27.07(23.42) 
.41(.47) 
87.37(42.77) 
-22.57(43.77) 
46.45(45.80) 
75.29(56.90) 
91.94(61.27) 
33.62(30.27) 
.07(.01) 
63.59(31.99) 
-22.60(35.74) 
118.35(32.37) 
13.64(33.31) 
.09(.19) 
.67(5.98) 
.88(1.61) 
23.24(51.48) 
24.82(33.32) 
59.10(57.67) 
.54 
26.39(22.98) 
.38(.98) 
123.41(89.66) 
-3.04(90.41) 
101.46(94.74) 
-114.61(118.69) 
129.58(127.27) 
49.19(63.05) 
.13(.02) 
93.73(66.59) 
-63.19(74.27) 
348.79(67.45) 
53.41(68.56) 
.48(.39) 
13.93(12.48) 
2.98(3.37) 
164.58(106.14) 
-12.56(69.67) 
159.06(119.89) 
.58 
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Notes 
1. While in theory people could borrow against their future pension promises, capital 
markets are not likely to be so perfect that they can do so without facing interest rates that 
rise with the size of the desired loan. 
2. "Normal cost" is the actuarial value (in the present) of the increase in pension 
liabilities incurred during the current year—or the yearly contribution to the pension fund 
needed to keep it fully funded. 
3. Equation (1), of course, restricts the wage-fringe trade-offs to be constant (linear). 
Alternative specifications of this "basic" equation would allow the trade-offs to be non-
linear, as suggested by our discussions of figures 10.2 and 10.3. While for the sake of 
convenience our analysis of the data and estimation problems will center on equation (1), 
we will briefly discuss our results using other functional forms. 
4. Equation (2) can be viewed as a linear approximation to the complex way in which 
pension benefits are actually computed. There is no reason, of course, to think that a linear 
approximation is sacred, and future researchers might use more complex forms (e.g., higher 
order polynomials) to increase the precision of the instrument for P that is obtained. We 
should note, however, that this linear approximation has been used with some success in 
prior research (Smith 1981). 
5. Equation (7) is derived by assuming that the following equations hold for, say the 400 
and 100 Hay Point levels: 
(7a) P4O0 = b'^ + blWioo + b"zZ + u", 
(7b) F100 = b0 + b, Wi'oo + b'zZ + u'. 
Subtracting (7b) from (7a) results in equation (7), where 
bo = b'o- bo, AW = W o^o - W^QO; bz = b"z - b'z; and u = u" - u'. 
6. We are indebted to Charles Brown for this suggestion. 
7. For reasons discussed earlier, fringe benefits except "paid days off" were added to the 
salary variable. 
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